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Tradition and the Law:
A Response to Wax

DANA NELKIN*

Professor Wax’s paper begins with the observation that there is no
unified, systematic exposition of the anti-gay-marriage position.1 It then
makes a subtle and skillful attempt to develop such a position by appeal
to a conservative line of thought that rests on respect for tradition in
assessing political and social change.2 Wax points to Edmund Burke and
Michael Oakeshott as leading representatives of this general approach,3
while exploring the ways in which their views might be understood to
apply to an issue that they themselves did not discuss. Although I am
skeptical that the position Wax presents succeeds in its aim, I do believe
that she provides a great service in bringing a case of this kind to the
table. Only when we have a real, developed position in hand, can we do
justice to the issue in evaluating it. The following provides a brief
overview of some key points in Wax’s paper and the start of an evaluation.
In the first part of Wax’s paper, the conservative approach is spelled
out, and it is made clear that both Edmund Burke and Michael Oakeshott
advocate adherence to traditional ways of doing things as the result of
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accumulated wisdom based on experience.4 Further, both Burke and
Oakeshott are distrustful of basing attempts at change on abstract
reasoning.5 Burke worries that we are more likely to go wrong if we leave
tradition behind, because we cannot possibly predict the consequences of
our decisions if we stick to reason alone.6 Oakeshott worries that trying
to justify ourselves at “the bar of reason” will lead to an attempt at
perfection and so ultimately to paralysis,7 and he also worries that reason
demands consistency and exceptionless principles which are too simple
for the real complex world we inhabit.8 Both acknowledge, however,
that change happens organically, and that some change is good.9
The second part of Wax’s paper seeks a heuristic, based on these
considerations, for when we should accept change.10 As Wax makes clear,
Burke offers a very explicit one: for legislative change, it is at least
necessary that a majority of people want change and that—despite their
reverence for tradition—they see the status quo as intolerable.11 It
appears less certain that Oakeshott offers as clear a criterion.
In the third part of the paper, Wax seeks to apply the line of reasoning
developed so far to the case of gay marriage, and identifies aspects of the
pro-gay-marriage movement that Burke’s and Oakeshott’s reasoning
would lead us to resist.12 For example, she argues, on this line of
reasoning, the fact that only a minority is pushing for change and the fact
that the movement is driven by principles provide strong reasons to resist
change in favor of gay marriage.13 Further, in response to demands that
opponents provide evidence that change would bring destruction in its
wake, Burke and Oakeshott would respond that such demands places the
burden of proof in exactly the wrong corner.14
After this, the conclusion of the paper is a bit surprising, since Wax
does not quite answer whether Burke and Oakeshott’s reasoning leads to
a rejection of gay marriage. She seems to hesitate for at least two reasons.
First, circumstances have changed in certain ways. For example, there is
a need for adult care as we human beings live longer and participation in
gay marriage can increase the number of caregivers.15 Second, it is
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unclear that marriage will survive if it does not adapt to the movement in
support of gay marriage.16
Professor Wax has provided a very helpful elucidation of a traditional
line of thought and addressed the fascinating question of whether this
line provides the answer conservatives are seeking in the case of gay
marriage. It may be, of course, that most actual opponents of gay
marriage base their views on religious beliefs, or on beliefs that are
secular and inchoate, and so do not adopt the well-developed, secular,
and traditional line of thought developed in this paper. However, it is a
great benefit to have such a view on the table. Naturally, her paper
raises a few questions.
While it is not clear why Burke adopts the particular heuristic that he
does, it seems pretty clear that some of his necessary conditions, such as
majority approval for endorsing change, are simply not met when it
comes to gay marriage in the United States in 2005. For example, recent
elections have shown that the majority—at least in many states—is
disinclined toward social change in this area. Given Burke’s heuristic, it
seems pretty clear that Burke should reject gay marriage. Thus, it is puzzling
that Wax hesitates at the end of her paper. The following hypothesis
might resolve the puzzle: she is giving more weight to Burke’s general
rationale—his faith in tradition over reason—than to the particular
heuristic that is supposed to arise from it. The heuristic simply does not
match the general rationale, and it is reasonable to favor the general
rationale over the heuristic.
Wax sets out to construct a respectable case for opposition to gay
marriage. Does the reasoning of Burke and Oakeshott meet that standard?
For Burke, at least, the whole point is that respecting tradition and
making slow incremental changes is less likely to have disastrous
consequences than sudden change divorced from tradition. It is interesting
that we now have as part of our history some rather large and fairly fast
principle-driven changes. Moreover, these are precisely the sort of
principles to which gay marriage advocates now appeal. Consider, for
example, the principled end to slavery in the South. Thus, some principled
changes fared well, even though perhaps some have not. Nevertheless,
these changes themselves provide experience for us to draw on. One
might argue that we have a toss-up, then, between slow change and fast,
principled change, with different experiences supporting each course of
16.

Id. at 1097.
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action. Or perhaps principled change comes out ahead. There is quite a
record to examine. This is not a criticism that the conservative line gets the
wrong outcome in the case of slavery, although it does. It is rather that,
given accumulating tradition, it is not at all clear that tradition itself
speaks in favor of only small, slow, unprincipled changes. All this is
consistent with the kinds of considerations Wax raises at the end of her
paper.
It appears, then, that if Burke’s majority requirement is bracketed, his
ultimate rationale, together with the data, might not lead to a rejection of
gay marriage, after all. In contrast, Oakeshott’s reasoning seems to lead
more directly to an anti-gay-marriage stance because Oakeshott seems
motivated more directly by a distrust of principle. He associates principle
with exceptionlessness, and this, in turn, with oversimplification of a
complex world. With principle thus tainted, it seems that we should be
suspicious of principle-driven change all by itself, whether the majority
is behind it or not.17 But this is a mistake. Proponents of change are
happy to countenance exceptions, just so long as they are principled
ones. (Whether we have a single exceptionless principle or a principle
with a variety of principled exceptions is a matter of presentation in the
end.) What matters is overall consistency, of course, but consistency
need not be simple. Once we distinguish consistency from simplicity,
Oakeshott’s phobia about principle and reasoning is revealed. At this
point, the question of hypocrisy looms large, as Oakeshott tries to
convince us of the rightness of his view. Wax alludes to this worry at
one point, calling it a “paradox,” but perhaps lets him off too easily. In
the end, Oakeshott’s argument might turn out to be more promising in
entailing an opposition to gay marriage than Burke’s, but at a significant
cost in the plausibility of its premise.
Finally, both Burke and Oakeshott acknowledge that some change can
be good. Further, both are interested in recommending the conservative
course because they think it will lead to better outcomes. Yet, it is
important to ask, what measure is being used in assessing outcomes? Is
an outcome better when more people have more well-being, or when
they are more autonomous, or something else? If any of the above, then
perhaps they are less averse to principle than first appears.
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